Modes of Responsibility: Part 1
Who is a victim of homicide?
Abstract: In this lecture I will discuss the question of an ontological status of a victim of homicide in order to clarify the significance of homicide in contexts of legal and moral philosophies. The starting point is in that the victim must be understood as a non-existence by definition. Does that victim suffer harm? If we answer yes as we usually suppose, we should face a traditional view of death proposed by Epicurus, which I will call ‘the harmlessness theory of death.’ I will tackle this problem by considering causal influence brought about by what the victim left before their death. I will also mention the issue of posthumous predications, suggesting proper semantics for that through the argument on the causal influence of the victim.
Modes of Responsibility: Part 2
Freedom, Responsibility, and Natural Phenomena
Abstract: In this lecture I will examine an aspect of the traditional problem of freedom and responsibility by taking a biological point of view into account, in order to aim at clarifying criminal responsibility. First, I will raise two of my strategies in confronting the issue of freedom and responsibility, namely, making the distinction of tenses and introducing the notion of degrees. Then, I will examine two proposals concerning freedom and responsibility from viewpoints of life science, i.e. Libet’s experiments and criminal genes. Finally, I will try to apply my strategies to those proposals. What I want to highlight is how intrinsically uncertain criminal responsibility is.
Modes of Responsibility: Part 3
Death Penalty and Human Rights
Abstract: In this lecture I will take a historical approach to investigate the issue of the death penalty. Namely, I will examine John Locke’s theory of property rights, i.e. the labour theory of property, on the basis of which I will discuss the justifiability and possibility of the death penalty. The crucial question is whether our lives themselves could be categorized as an object of our property rights or not. Arguing this question, I will propose my view, which might be called ‘impossibilism’ on the death penalty rather than retentionism or abolitionism. The impossibilism is a hypothetical or conditional view presupposing the theory of human rights. Thus, I will finally scrutinize how to estimate the theory of human rights in general.
Listen to recordings of the lectures here:
Who is a victim of homicide? Click here to listen to the first lecture.
Freedom, Responsibility, and Natural Phenomena. Click here to listen to the second lecture.
Death Penalty and Human Rights. Click here to listen to the third lecture.